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Can’t Live With ‘Em Can’t Live Without ‘Em: An 
Analysis of the Trial Court’s Authority to Hear 
and Decide Child-Related Claims in North 
Carolina Post-Baumann 
AMY L. BRITT* AND ALICIA JURNEY WHITLOCK** 
 
In Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, decided in May 2011, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals held for the first time that trial courts have 
the authority to enter orders related to child custody and child support 
before a husband and wife have separated.1  The Baumann court carefully 
distinguished its decision from the holding in Harper v. Harper, a 1981 
case in which the court held that the wife’s pre-separation custody and 
child support claims should have been dismissed.2  The Baumann deci-
sion raises some interesting questions about the limits of the trial court’s 
ability to enter orders protecting the interests of children when those in-
terests conflict with the rights of parents. 
Part I of this Article discusses the historical background of the role 
of fault in divorce and other domestic claims in the United States and 
North Carolina.  Part II analyzes the Court of Appeals’ decision in Har-
per and the state of the law following the Harper ruling.  Part III analyzes 
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Baumann.  Part IV considers how North 
Carolina’s approach to pre-separation child custody and support claims 
compares to the law in other states.  Finally, Part V discusses the impli-
cations and application of Baumann for North Carolina practitioners. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the significance of Baumann, it is important 
to consider the role of fault in domestic claims in a historical context. 
 
* Amy L. Britt is an associate and a Board Certified Specialist in Family Law practicing at 
Cheshire Parker Schneider & Bryan, PLLC in Raleigh, North Carolina. 
** Alicia Jurney Whitlock is an associate in the litigation practice group of Smith Deb-
nam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP in Raleigh, North Carolina. 
 1. Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 2. Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
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A.  Historical Background of No-Fault Divorce in the United States 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, most states’ divorce 
laws included more expansive fault grounds for divorce and, therefore, 
were more permissive than they were in the early nineteenth century.3  
In the last quarter of the century, many blamed the expanded fault bases 
for the rising number of divorces and, “[i]n response, a number of states 
restricted [their] fault grounds.”4  Divorce laws in the United States va-
ried extensively by the middle of the twentieth century, with some states 
reflecting fewer and more conservative fault grounds, and others main-
taining their expanded fault grounds.5  Notwithstanding discrepancies 
among the states, all of these laws reflected the same basic premise: “that 
divorce was an adversary proceeding in which an innocent spouse ‘won’ 
a divorce from a guilty spouse.”6 
The practical result of these fault-based divorce laws was a disparity 
between the statutory law and the law in action.  For example, until 
1967, New York recognized only adultery as grounds for divorce and, 
rather than having the intended effect of discouraging divorce, the prac-
tical effect was frequently collusion, perjury, and fabricated grounds for 
divorce.7  This disparity illustrated American society’s rejection of the 
severe limitations imposed by some states on the right to divorce.8 
By the mid-1960s, reform was underway.9  California led the way 
and proposed legislation that would allow a divorce upon a showing of 
“irreconcilable differences causing the irremediable breakdown of the 
marriage.”10  The enacted legislation eliminated the fault-based scheme 
in California and “the need for either party to establish [the] ‘guilt’ of the 
other . . . to end in law a marriage that one or both of the parties be-
lieved had ended in fact.”11 
In many ways, the California statute became the model of divorce 
reform in the 1970s.  Like California, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act of 1973 (UMDA) “relied on [the] irretrievable breakdown [of the 
 
 3. 2 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE’S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 7.2 (5th ed. 1999). 
 4. Id. (citing N.M. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 84 (1962)). 
 5. Id. (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 503 (2d ed. 
1985)). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (citing 1969 Cal. Stat. 3324). 
 11. Id. 
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marriage] for the basis of the decree of dissolution.”12  Although few 
states have adopted the UMDA in its entirety,13 divorce laws of most 
states reflect the concept of marriage breakdown as the most important 
inquiry in the granting of a divorce decree.14  “Today the statutes of all 
states recognize at least one no-fault basis for divorce . . . .”15 
B.  Historical Background of Fault Bases in North Carolina 
Prior to 1977, wrongful conduct barred a divorce based on separa-
tion in North Carolina.  The doctrine of recrimination denied a divorce 
to a petitioning spouse guilty of misconduct that would entitle the other 
spouse to a divorce.16  In Byers II, a 1943 decision, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals stated in dicta:  
The law generally forbids redress to one for an injury done him by 
another, if he himself first be in the wrong about the same matters whe-
reof he complains. . . . No one is permitted to profit by his own fraud, or 
to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found a claim on his own in-
iquity, or to acquire rights by his own crime. . . . 
  . . . Nor is it to be ascribed as the legislative intent that one spouse may 
drive the other from their home for [the statutory period of separation], 
without any cause or excuse, and then obtain a divorce solely upon the 
ground of such separation created by the complainant’s own dereliction.  Out 
of unilateral wrongs arise rights in favor of the wronged, but not in favor of 
the wrongdoer.  One who plants a domestic thornbush or thistle need not ex-
pect to gather grapes or figs from it.17 
In 1977 and 1979, the General Assembly enacted amendments, 
which effectively eliminated the role of fault in divorce based on separa-
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. § 7.2 & n.50 (5th ed. Supp. 2011) (citing 9A U.L.A. 10 (Supp. 1998)) (“As of 
[the publication of this article], only Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana and Washington had adopted the UDMA or major parts of it.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. § 7.3.  Until August 2010, New York still lacked a unilateral “no-fault” divorce 
statute.  Under New York divorce law only if both parties notarized a separation agree-
ment and lived separately for one year, could a judge convert it into a divorce.  New York 
governor David Paterson signed a no-fault divorce bill on August 13, 2010, which went 
into effect on October 12, 2010 making New York the last state in the United States to 
adopt no-fault divorce.  See Act of Aug. 13, 2010, ch. 384, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws (McKin-
ney) (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170.7 (McKinney 2010)). 
 16. See Hyder v. Hyder, 1 S.E.2d 540 (N.C. 1939); Brown v. Brown, 196 S.E. 333 
(N.C. 1938); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 181 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1935). 
 17. Byers v. Byers, 25 S.E.2d 466, 469–470 (N.C. 1943) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
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tion.  In the first 1977 amendment, all defenses based upon misconduct 
as established in section 50-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes 
were abolished.18  “The second 1977 amendment abolished all defenses 
based on misconduct as established in [s]ection 50-7.”19  Finally, the 
1979 “amendment abolished the defenses of res judicata and recrimina-
tion without regard to any statutory reference to . . . misconduct.”20 
Despite the 1977 and 1979 amendments to the divorce statutes, 
fault bases survived in a support context until 1995.  Prior to 1995,  
  The entitlement provision for alimony, which the law applied also to 
alimony pendente lite, gave marital misconduct a central role: alimony 
pendente lite was not available unless it appeared to the court that the 
dependent spouse could prove that the supporting spouse had commit-
ted an act of marital misconduct enumerated in the statute.21 
The 1995 statutory amendments increased attention to needs, reim-
bursement and rehabilitation, and “eliminated the role of marital mis-
conduct as a prerequisite to entitlement.”22  In its 1995 revisions, the 
General Assembly made need the only requirement for an award of ali-
mony.23  According to Professor Suzanne Reynolds, with the 1995 
amendments, “[n]eed is the central inquiry in the alimony determina-
tion, with fault relegated to ‘factor’ status. . . . Although the list starts 
with marital misconduct, all of the other fifteen factors focus on the eco-
nomic circumstances of the parties.”24  The current statute downgrades 
“fault to a secondary position, only one of many, often more significant, 
factors.”25  An award of post-separation support, like an award of alimo-
ny, is based on economic factors, and the court may appropriately award 
spousal support if neither spouse offers evidence of misconduct.26  As 
between post-separation and alimony, fault is even less significant for 
post-separation support.27 
 
 18. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 7.4 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-5(1)–(5) (Repl. Vol. 
1976)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (2011); 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 775, 775–76. 
 21. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 8.2; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2–.3 (1994), 
repealed by 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641. 
 22. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 8.2. 
 23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (2011); 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 643–45. 
 24. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 9.3. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. § 8.2. 
 27. See id. 
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II.  THE HARPER DECISION 
At the time of the Harper decision in 1981, fault was still required 
to receive alimony or alimony pendente lite.  In Harper, the mother only 
filed claims for child custody, child support, and attorney’s fees, and 
sought possession of the marital residence and a car incident to her 
claims for child custody and support.  In her complaint, she alleged that 
she and the children’s father were not happy and that it was in the best 
interests of the parties and the children for the parties to separate.28  She 
did not allege that the father had committed misconduct or that he had 
failed to provide adequate support for the family.29  Because the mother 
did not file a claim for alimony or alimony pendente lite, she was not re-
quired to allege, and the trial court was not required to rule on, the exis-
tence of any of the statutorily enumerated fault grounds. 
Judge John H. Parker, the trial judge presiding in Harper, recalled, 
“I tried to avoid memorializing the parties’ bad acts on paper unless I had 
to, by statute, in order to support the decision.”30  Judge Parker ex-
plained that had he deemed such a finding necessary, the evidence be-
fore the trial court could have supported a finding of misconduct.  Spe-
cifically, he recalled that the mother in Harper was a soft-spoken, quiet 
homemaker while the father was controlling, uncompromising, and 
emotionally abusive to the rest of the family.31  He ran the parties’ 
household in military fashion and subjected the family to radical reli-
gious rituals against their wishes.32  Judge Parker omitted such findings 
in the record because he was convinced that the court had the inherent 
authority to provide for the support and welfare of children, including 
their shelter and transportation, without a finding of misconduct of ei-
ther party.33  Working on the premise that the children’s interests were 
more important than the rights of the parties, Judge Parker found it to be 
in the children’s best interests for the court to award possession of the 
home to the children and custody of the children to the mother.34 
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s belief that it 
had the inherent authority to award use and possession of the marital 
 
 28. Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
 29. Id. at 735. 
 30. Interview with The Honorable John H. Parker, Partner, Cheshire Parker 
Schneider & Bryan, PLLC, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 3, 2011). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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residence incident to child custody and support.35  Reasoning that the 
mother’s complaint attempted to assert a claim for a “no fault” divorce 
from bed and board, the Court of Appeals found that she “fail[ed] to 
state a claim upon which relief [could] be granted” under North Caroli-
na law.36  The court specifically held that: 
[W]here, as here, husband and wife are living together, the children be-
ing in their joint custody and being adequately supported by the sup-
porting spouse, in the absence of allegation[s] that would support an 
award of alimony or divorce, one spouse may not maintain an action to 
evict the other, get sole custody of the children, and obtain an order for 
child support .37 
The court relied on the language of section 50-13.4(e) in effect at 
the time of the ruling, which stated, in relevant part, “Payment for the 
support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic pay-
ments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any inter-
est therein, or a security interest in real property, as the court may order”; 
and contrasted the language of section 50-13.4 to the language of the 
alimony statute, section 50-16.7(a), which expressly authorized the trial 
court to award “possession of real property,” as opposed to only a securi-
ty interest, as part of an alimony award.38  The court reasoned that, 
“[e]ven if the wife and children had been living separate from the hus-
band and there was a justiciable controversy as to custody and support,” 
a judge may not “evict [the husband] from his home and assign it to his 
wife for her use and that of the children, in the absence of allegations 
and proof of matters that would also support an award of alimony or di-
vorce [from bed and board].”39  Summarizing its ruling, the court con-
cluded, “plaintiff, without just cause or excuse, wants out of the mar-
riage, but not out of the marital home.  The law cannot require her to 
live with her husband, but it will not allow her to evict him.”40 
A.  State of the Law Pre-Baumann 
Shortly after Harper was decided, the General Assembly amended 
sections 50-13.4(e) and (f)(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes to 
allow the trial court to award the possession of real property incident to 
child support, despite the holding in Harper.  As the trial judge respon-
 
 35. Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
 36. Id. at 733–34. 
 37. Id. at 733. 
 38. Id. at 734. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 735. 
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/5
WHITLOCK FINAL 4/12/2012  9:09 AM 
2012] CHILD-RELATED CLAIMS POST-BAUMANN 455 
sible for the decision on appeal, Judge Parker received a copy of the 
Court of Appeals’ decision before it was released as a slip opinion.  Con-
cerned about the potential implications and the weight the appellate 
court placed on the inconsistency in statutory remedies for alimony and 
child support, Judge Parker immediately approached Representative Joe 
Hackney about amending the statutes and codifying what he believed 
was the trial court’s inherent authority to provide shelter as a form of 
child support.41  Within 72 hours of his meeting with Judge Parker, Rep-
resentative Hackney proposed a bill that would expressly amend sections 
50-13.4(e) and (f)(2) to allow courts to award the possession of real 
property as a form of child support and a means to enforce non-payment 
of support.42  The effect of the amendment should have been that a trial 
court could award possession of the home to the party who was the reci-
pient of child support payments.  However, some courts still referred to 
Harper to interpret section 50-13.4, despite the fact that the statute had 
been amended. 
As a result, prior to the ruling in Baumann, it was unclear whether a 
party could rely successfully on the child support statutes as authority to 
seek possession of the home prior to separation.  Many district court 
judges relied on Harper in support of the proposition that there was no 
justiciable issue as to custody and support of children between parents 
as long as the parents were living together and the children were being 
adequately supported, absent allegations of fault.  Accordingly, before 
Baumann, the general belief among most North Carolina family law prac-
titioners was that possession could only be ordered before separation as 
part of a Chapter 50B domestic violence protective order, or as part of an 
order for child support, post-separation support, or alimony entered af-
ter a divorce from bed and board had been granted. 
III.  THE BAUMANN DECISION 
In Baumann, the mother filed a complaint against the father seeking 
“temporary and permanent custody of the parties’ children, temporary 
and permanent child support, post-separation support and alimony, and 
attorney’s fees.”43  At the time the mother filed the complaint, the parties 
had not separated.44  The mother alleged that she “desire[d] to separate 
 
 41. Interview with The Honorable John H. Parker, supra note 30. 
 42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(e), (f)(2) (2011); Act of May 28, 1981, ch. 472 § 
1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 736. 
 43. Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431, 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 44. Id. 
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from [Defendant], but believe[d] it [was] in the parties’ and minor child-
ren’s best interest that the issues set forth [in her complaint] be resolved 
before said separation occurr[ed.]”45  Neither party filed a claim for di-
vorce from bed and board, and, as in Harper, the mother “made no writ-
ten allegations of marital misconduct on the part of [the father] in her 
Complaint.”46  In addition, and in contrast to Harper, the mother in 
Baumann did not ask the court to remove the Defendant from the marital 
home.47  The trial court concluded as a matter of law that it did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over any of the mother’s claims “because 
there was no evidence of a physical separation and there was no pending 
claim by [the mother] for divorce from bed and board or possession of 
the marital residence.”48 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial 
court’s judgment, holding that the trial court did, in fact, have subject-
matter jurisdiction over the mother’s claims for custody and child sup-
port, even though the parties had not physically separated and no com-
plaint for divorce from bed and board had been filed.49  As to the wife’s 
post-separation support claim, the Court of Appeals found that the trial 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim prior to a physi-
cal separation of the parties or a filing of divorce from bed and board.50  
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.51 
The Court of Appeals relied on the statutory language governing 
child custody, child support, and post-separation support in making its 
decision.  Citing multiple references to “date of separation” in the statu-
tory provisions governing post-separation support, the Court of Appeals 
found that the General Assembly did not contemplate the availability of 
this remedy prior to separation.52  However, the court distinguished 
claims relating to the economic needs of dependent spouses from those 
related to the custody and care of children, finding that the statutory 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 433. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 436 
 50. Id. at 437–38. 
 51. Immediately after the temporary hearing resulting in the order on appeal in 
Baumann, the parties separated.  Thereafter, and before the case came back before the 
trial court on remand, the parties settled their issues privately outside of court via Sepa-
ration Agreement; their divorce is now final.  E-Mail from Alyscia Gray Ellis, Principal, 
Ellis Family Law, PLLC, (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with authors). 
 52. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 437. 
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language governing child custody and child support does not require 
physical separation or a complaint for divorce, either absolute or from 
bed and board, to be filed before a court can address custody or sup-
port.53  Specifically, section 50-13.5(g) states, “orders for custody and 
support of minor children may be entered when the matter is before the 
court as provided by this section, irrespective of the rights of the wife and 
the husband as between themselves in an action for annulment or an action 
for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony 
without divorce.”54  The appellate court reasoned that the “history of the 
applicable statutory provisions and the reasons underlying their enact-
ment” did not reveal a legislative intent to require physical separation of 
the parents.55 
In support of its ruling, the Court of Appeals relied on Martin v. 
Martin, in which it stated, “we have previously rejected the contention 
that our courts may not award possession of real estate as a part of child 
support” on the theory that “shelter is a necessary component of a child’s 
needs and in many instances it is more feasible for a parent to provide 
actual shelter than it is for the parent to provide monetary payments to 
obtain shelter.”56  With respect to custody, the court cited Lee’s North 
Carolina Family Law, which states: “a court may order possession of real 
property as a payment of child support or as a way to effectuate an order 
for custody.”57 
Ultimately, the Baumann court asserted that “the purpose of actions 
for child custody and child support is, consistently with the law’s over-
riding interest in protecting minor children, to assure that the needs of 
such children are adequately met.”58  Relying on the principle set forth in 
MacKenzie v. MacKenzie,59 that “[a] court having jurisdiction of children 
located within the state surely has the inherent authority to protect those 
children and make such temporary orders as their best interests may re-
quire[,]” the Court of Appeals held that child custody and child support 
claims are not precluded by the fact that the parties have neither physi-
 
 53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1, -13.5 (2011). 
 54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(g) (emphasis added). 
 55. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 435; N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-13.5. 
 56. Martin v. Martin, 242 S.E.2d 393, 396–97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Boul-
ware v. Boulware, 208 S.E.2d. 239, 240–41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)). 
 57. 1 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE’S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 6.23(A) (5th ed. 
1993). 
 58. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436; see also Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d. 528, 530 (N.C. 
1997). 
 59. MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 204 S.E.2d 561, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). 
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cally separated nor asserted divorce from bed and board claims against 
each other.60 
The Court of Appeals’ ruling in Baumann was consistent with the 
trial court’s belief in Harper that the interests of children are paramount 
to the rights of the parties as between themselves, whether to occupy the 
marital residence or otherwise.  As to parents’ “rights,” Judge Parker con-
tends they are secondary and consist, arguably, of “constitutional stand-
ing that allows them a preeminent claim to seek custody/visitation as to 
the rest of the world” and “the right to ask for support as trustee on be-
half of a child.”61  He contends that children, on the other hand, have the 
rights to be safe and secure in the custody of a party with “standing,” and 
to be supported adequately.62  Both Judge Parker and the Court of Ap-
peals’ ruling in Baumann suggest that, where children are involved, 
North Carolina courts should have the authority to protect the interests 
of the child over the interests of the parents, and the parents “rights,” 
whatever they are, are secondary. 
Distinguishing Harper from Baumann 
As the Court of Appeals noted in its Baumann decision, Baumann 
and Harper are distinguishable.63  Footnote four of the Baumann opinion 
reads as though the Court of Appeals viewed Harper as focusing more 
narrowly on the issue of whether one spouse could be evicted from the 
marital residence incident to custody or child support before separation 
without allegations or findings of fault.64  In Baumann, the issue was 
whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter any cus-
tody or child support order before separation of the parties.65  While 
Harper held that a trial court could not enter an order that resulted in a 
marital separation without establishing fault on the part of the non-
custodial parent,66 Baumann relied on section 50-13.4 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes to conclude that the court can enter pre-separation 
orders addressing child custody and child support, which may effectuate 
separation by awarding possession of the parties’ residence to the cus-
todial parent.67  Accordingly, the court’s holding in Baumann is broader 
 
 60. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting MacKenzie, 204 S.E.2d at 563). 
 61. Interview with The Honorable John H. Parker, supra note 30. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436 n.4. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 432. 
 66. Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
 67. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436. 
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than the holding in Harper, and creates a procedural gateway for litigants 
who want to address custody and child support issues while they are still 
living together. 
Consistent with the trial court’s belief in Harper, the court’s ruling 
in Baumann clarified that the interests of children are paramount to 
rights of the mother and father as between themselves.  The Baumann 
ruling is also consistent with the evolving concept of needs over fault in 
other domestic claims.  Because a finding of fault is not necessary to de-
termine the best interests of a child or to provide the support necessary 
to meet a child’s reasonable needs, post-Baumann trial court judges now 
have the clear authority to do what the appellate court found the trial 
court could not do in Harper. 
IV. INTERSTATE COMPARISON 
A sampling of other states’ approaches to the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction to enter orders awarding exclusive possession of the marital 
residence, custody or support demonstrates some important trends in 
this area of the law, especially as it relates to fault grounds and separa-
tion. 
A.  New York 
In New York, claims for child custody, child support and pendente 
lite spousal maintenance, as well as payment of expenses for the house 
(mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, etc.) by the supporting spouse, can 
be initiated while the parties are still living in the same house.  New 
York Domestic Relations Law section 236(B)(8)(b) provides that: 
  In any action where the court has ordered temporary maintenance, 
maintenance, distributive award or child support, the court may direct 
that payment be made directly to the other spouse or a third person for 
real and personal property and services furnished to the other spouse, or 
for the rental or mortgage amortization or interest payments, insurances, 
taxes, repairs, or other carrying charges on premises occupied by the 
other spouse, or for both payments to the other spouse and to such third 
persons.  Such direction may be made notwithstanding that the parties con-
tinue to reside in the same abode and notwithstanding that the court refus-
es to grant the relief requested by the other spouse.68 
 
 68. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(8)(b) (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, in New York, temporary spousal support, child support, and 
counsel fees may be awarded where the parties continue to reside in the 
same household.69 
As to child custody, subdivision 1 of section 240 requires the court 
to inquire into both the custody and support arrangements for children 
in the context of certain matrimonial litigation (i.e., actions to annul a 
marriage; to declare the nullity of a void marriage; for a separation; and 
for a divorce),70 whether the parents or other adult litigants raise issues 
concerning the children or not.  Consistent with the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals’ rationale in Baumann, New York courts have an affir-
mative obligation to ensure that children who are within its jurisdiction 
are placed in the care of the most appropriate custodian, and that the 
persons legally responsible for their support are obligated to provide an 
appropriate level of support.71  Jurisdiction to determine child custody 
and support is not dependent on whether matrimonial relief is granted, 
and the court may provide for child custody and support even if matri-
 
 69. See Salerno v. Salerno, 531 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (“[M]ere 
fact that parties continue to reside in same household after commencement of matri-
monial action does not preclude award of temporary maintenance or temporary child 
support; such awards are designed to insure that reasonable needs are met during the 
pendency of matrimonial litigation.” (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 514 N.Y.S.2d 45, 45 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1987))); see also Malin v. Malin, 326 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31–32 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1971) (noting that denial of temporary alimony, child support, and counsel fees was not 
appropriate simply because the complaint was not served on the husband even though 
wife was living with husband when the separation action was brought). 
 70. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.  The Equitable Distribution Law defines the term ma-
trimonial action to include, in addition to the four categories listed above, actions for the 
“dissolution of a marriage” (i.e., Enoch Arden proceedings, see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 
220, 221); for the declaration of the validity or nullity of a foreign judgment of divorce; 
for the declaration of the validity of a marriage; and proceedings to obtain equitable dis-
tribution or maintenance following a foreign judgment of divorce.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
236(B)(2); see also CPLR 105 (subd. p).  While these actions are defined as matrimonial 
actions for equitable distribution and other economic purposes, no jurisdiction is con-
veyed to permit custody determinations to be made as ancillary relief in such actions.  Cf. 
Gontaryk v. Gontaryk, 246 N.Y.S.2d 270, 270–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).  In order to ob-
tain a custody determination, an independent proceeding must be initiated in either the 
Supreme Court or Family Court.  However, subdivision 7 of Part B of section 236 per-
mits the court to award temporary or permanent child support in “any matrimonial ac-
tion.”  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(2).  Thus, in any matrimonial action, defined as 
such by the Equitable Distribution Law, the court may determine child support but may 
not decide the issue of custody unless the action is one of the types of action specifically 
identified in section 240 of New York’s Domestic Relations Laws.  Alan D. Sheinkman, 
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (2010). 
 71. Sheinkman, supra note 70, § 240. 
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monial status relief is denied. 72  In fact, New York courts have ordered 
custody or parenting schedules, including weeknight responsibility for 
the children, between parents living in the same house and awarding 
each spouse exclusive use and occupancy of different portions of the 
same house.73 
While New York does not statutorily address whether a trial court 
may award possession of the marital residence incident to child custody 
or child support, New York Domestic Relations Law section 234 vests 
the court with the authority to award exclusive occupancy of the marital 
residence during the pendency of an action.74  Section 234 specifically 
states, in relevant part, that the court may: 
[M]ake such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of 
property, as in the court’s discretion justice requires having regard to the 
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.  Such direction 
may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time 
to time before or subsequent to final judgment.75 
Notwithstanding this broad statutory language, certain decisional 
standards have evolved, limiting the trial court’s application of section 
234 to award possession of the marital residence to a party on an interim 
basis.  For example, courts have consistently held that a pendente lite 
award of exclusive occupancy of the marital residence should not be 
granted unless it is demonstrated that it “is necessary to protect the safe-
ty of persons and property.”76  In most situations, possession of the ma-
rital residence may not be awarded on an ex parte basis.77  However, 
where extrinsic evidence (such as police reports, medical records, the 
issuance of an order of protection, or third-party affidavits) corroborates 
the moving party’s allegations, the court may grant exclusive occupancy 
without a hearing.78 
 
 72. E.g., Caldwell v. Caldwell, 81 N.E.2d 60 (N.Y. 1948); Miller v. Miller, 198 
N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); La Rosa v. La Rosa, 373 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975). 
 73. E-mail from Theresa A. Girolamo, Associate, Goldschmidt & Genovese LLP 
(Oct. 19, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 74. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 2 TIMOTHY TIPPINS, NEW YORK MATRIMONIAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 17:33 (2011) 
(citing Blumenfield v. Blumenfield, 466 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)); see also Til-
linger v. Tillinger, 502 N.Y.S.2d 493, 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (noting that relief will 
be denied where there is insufficient evidence to show that exclusive use and occupancy 
is necessary to protect the safety of persons or property). 
 77. TIPPINS, supra note 76, § 17:33 (citing Blumenfield, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 63). 
 78. See Vallet v. Vallet, 446 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
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Other factors that have been considered by New York courts in de-
termining motions for exclusive occupancy of the marital residence on 
an interim basis include the availability of alternative accommodations 
to the spouse seeking exclusion, the availability of housing to the party 
who is the target of the motion, the proximity of the marital residence to 
one party’s employment, and the fact that the marital residence also 
serves as the place of business of one of the spouses.79  These standards 
reflect a judicial recognition in New York that an indiscriminate granting 
of exclusive occupancy orders would be tantamount to a summary evic-
tion proceeding by parties to matrimonial litigation not intended by the 
statute,80 echoing the concerns of the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
in Harper.81 
B.  California 
In California, one may seek pendente lite exclusive occupancy of the 
marital residence upon a showing that he or she is “more entitled” to re-
side there based upon a balancing of factors specified in section 6321 of 
the California Family Code (for domestic violence cases) and section 
6340 (for non-domestic violence cases).  Specifically, section 6321(a) 
states,  
  The court may issue an ex parte order excluding a party from the 
family dwelling, the dwelling of the other party, the common dwelling of 
both parties, or the dwelling of the person who has care, custody, and 
control of a child to be protected from domestic violence for the period 
of time and on the conditions the court determines, regardless of which 
party holds legal or equitable title or is the lessee of the dwelling.82 
Section 6340(b) states, 
  The court may issue an order described in Section 6321 excluding a 
person from a dwelling if the court finds that physical or emotional harm 
would otherwise result to the other party, to a person under the care, 
 
 79. TIPPINS, supra note 76, § 17:33 (citing Baylek v. Baylek, 442 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Rauch v. Rauch, 441 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); 
Binet v. Binet, 385 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence can also be awarded in 
New York where one spouse has voluntarily established an alternative residence and the 
spouse’s presence has caused domestic strife.  See Kristiansen v. Kristiansen, 534 
N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); see also Preston v. Preston, 537 N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 490 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
 82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6321 (2004). 
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custody and control of the other party, or to a minor child of the parties 
or of the other party.83 
In its practical application, the statutory language results in an air-
ing of the equities for the court to decide who gets to remain in the ma-
rital residence.  The court is to consider factors such as whether one par-
ty has primary custody of children who go to school nearby, the 
existence or non-existence of domestic violence, the need for one party 
to use the residence for work or employment purposes, and whether one 
party was the primary tenant or owner of the residence prior to mar-
riage, among other things.84  Consistent with its no-fault approach to the 
dissolution of marriage, California does not require a finding of fault to 
award possession of the marital residence to a party.85 
Moreover, in California, intact couples can reside in separate resi-
dences while legally separated parties may reside in the same residence 
(though it is more difficult to prove a date of separation when parties 
have chosen not to physically separate).86  In fact, the latter is an eco-
nomic reality for many in certain regions of California, including the Bay 
area.87  In California, one party may also seek custody or support orders 
while the parties are residing together, but separated.  Support orders 
can be made, as can orders regarding the ongoing payment of various 
community property obligations (i.e., mortgages, credit card payments), 
and those obligations often impact the amount of support that is or-
dered.88 
Family Code section 2010 is the basic jurisdictional statute for cus-
tody and support determinations in proceedings for dissolution of mar-
riage, nullity or legal separation in California.89  Independent actions for 
exclusive custody, brought pursuant to section 3120 without request for 
legal separation or dissolution of the marriage, are governed by all of the 
same statutory considerations as in custody disputes arising in regular 
dissolution proceedings.90  Family Code section 3120 specifically states, 
 
 83. Id. § 6340. 
 84. E-mail from Yasmine S. Mehmet, Principal, Law Offices of Yasmine S. Mehmet 
(Oct. 14, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 85. Juick v. Juick, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324, 329 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1971). 
 86. E-mail from Yasmine S. Mehmet, supra note 84. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2010 (2004). 
 90. Id. § 3021(d) (2004); 1 JUDITH R. FORMAN & PATRICIA PHILLIPS, CALIFORNIA 
TRANSACTIONS FORMS—FAMILY LAW § 3:4 (2011). 
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  Without filing a petition for dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion of the parties, the husband or wife may bring an action for the ex-
clusive custody of the children of the marriage.  The court may, during 
the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing thereof, or afterwards, 
make such order regarding the support, care, custody, education, and 
control of the children of the marriage as may be just and in accordance 
with the natural rights of the parents and the best interest of the child-
ren.  The order may be modified or terminated at any time thereafter as 
the natural rights of the parties and the best interest of the children may 
require.91 
Accordingly, California practitioners have seen cases where one 
party lived upstairs and the other downstairs, and the children dutifully 
went between floors on the respective parents’ custodial days.92  Given 
the ruling in Baumann, the same or similar scenario may now be a possi-
bility for parents residing together in North Carolina, whether they are 
contemplating separation or not. 
C.  Maryland 
The development of the law in Maryland regarding subject-matter 
jurisdiction to make pre-separation orders for child-related claims has 
followed a very similar track to that in North Carolina, including an em-
phasis and subsequent de-emphasis on fault.  For example, in the 1952 
case of Sheinin v. Sheinin, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court’s decision to grant the wife a limited divorce93 based on the hus-
band’s constructive desertion of her and awarded her alimony, custody 
of the children, and child support.94  As the wife’s complaint included a 
claim for limited divorce based on fault, and there appears to have been 
ample evidence to support finding the husband at fault,95 it is likely the 
Harper court would have agreed with the decision in Sheinin. 
However, in the more recent case of Ricketts v. Ricketts,96 decided by 
the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2006, the court interpreted and ex-
plained Maryland’s child custody and support statutes in the same way 
 
 91. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3120. 
 92. E-mail from Yasmine S. Mehmet, supra note 84. 
 93. The term “divorce” as used by the court in Ricketts, refers to a “limited divorce.”  
This is analogous to a divorce from bed and board under section 50-7 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (2011). 
 94. Sheinin v. Sheinin, 89 A.2d 609, 612–13 (Md. 1952). 
 95. For instance, Mr. Sheinin had an extramarital relationship with his secretary, 
whom he moved into the marital home while he and Mrs. Sheinin were still living to-
gether with their children.  Sheinin, 89 A.2d at 610–11. 
 96. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 903 A.2d 857 (Md. 2006). 
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that Baumann addressed sections 50-13.4 and 50-13.5 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes.97  On its face, section 5-203(d)(1) of Maryland’s 
Family Law Code appears to predicate the court’s authority to enter or-
ders regarding child custody upon the parties’ separation.  This section 
provides that “[i]f the parents live apart, a court may award custody of a 
minor child to either parent or joint custody to both parents.”98  The 
Court of Appeals in Ricketts carefully analyzed section 5-203(d)(1) in 
the context of section 1-20199—the statute granting power to courts of 
equity—and its previous decisions in cases concerning jurisdiction over 
child custody matters while the parties were not separated.  The Ricketts 
court concluded that “[t]he trial court . . . , whether, or not, it concludes 
that Mr. Ricketts is entitled to a divorce, has the jurisdiction and the 
power to determine the custody, visitation, and support of the Ricketts’ 
children.”100 
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed that section 1-201 “does 
more than simply describe the court’s jurisdiction; it instead is a grant of 
power, imbuing the courts with the responsibility to determine custody, 
visitation, and support regardless of whether the parents are divorced or 
physically separated.”101  Consistent with this interpretation, the court 
discussed its earlier decisions in Barnhard102 and Mower.103 
The court noted that the case of Barnhard v. Godfrey was decided 
“just months before the enactment of the predecessor legislation to [sec-
tion] 5-203(a)” in 1929.104  In that case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the “then applicable statute . . . empower[ed] the equity courts, whenev-
er application for that relief was sought by one or both parents, to de-
termine custody, support, and visitation ‘without regard to the question 
of whether or not the parents of said child or children have been di-
vorced or are living apart.’”105  The court further noted that the predeces-
sor to section 5-203(a) recognized the equity court’s “‘inherent pow-
er . . . over minors’”106 and that the exercise of the power should be done 
“‘with the paramount purpose in view of securing the welfare and pro-
 
 97. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 98. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 99. Id. § 1-201. 
 100. Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 870. 
 101. Id. at 867. 
 102. Barnhard v. Godfrey, 145 A. 614 (Md. 1929). 
 103. Mower v. Mower, 121 A.2d 185 (Md. 1956). 
 104. Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 868. 
 105. Id. (quoting Barnhard, 145 A. at 615). 
 106. Id. (quoting Barnhard, 145 A. at 615). 
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moting the best interest of the children.’”107  In light of its decision in 
Barnhard, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the legislature’s enactment 
of a custody statute requiring separation as a condition to making a cus-
tody award “did not disturb the courts’ right to determine custody, sup-
port, or visitation when divorce was not decreed.”108 
In Mower v. Mower,109 the wife’s complaint for alimony pendente lite, 
child custody, child support, and attorney’s fees included a claim for a 
limited divorce.110  Finding no grounds for a limited divorce where both 
parties were at fault “as they were content to live in a state of animosity 
and estrangement and that, therefore, no desertion had occurred,”111 the 
trial court refused to grant the divorce and dismissed the wife’s other 
claims.112  The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court’s 
decision, holding that the court had jurisdiction to rule on the wife’s 
claims for custody and support regardless of whether a limited divorce 
was granted.113 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals’ rationale for its holding in Ricketts 
was the same as Judge Parker’s reasoning114 for awarding custody of the 
children and possession of the house to the wife in Harper.  Like Judge 
Parker, the Court of Appeals concluded that its approach was “consistent 
with the primacy of the interests of the child and the courts’ paramount 
concern ‘to secure the welfare and promote the child’s best interests.’”115  
Four years after the Ricketts decision, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals reached the same conclusion in Baumann. 
D.  Missouri 
In Missouri, either party may file a motion for temporary relief 
while the case is pending and prior to separation.  Missouri courts do 
not have to address the questions of statutory interpretation that arose in 
Harper and Baumann to determine whether trial courts have jurisdiction 
to decide the issues of child custody and child support before separation 
because the legislature has unambiguously provided the courts with this 
 
 107. Id. (quoting Barnhard, 145 A. at 615). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Mower v. Mower, 121 A.2d 185 (Md. 1956). 
 110. Id. at 186. 
 111. Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 869 (citing Mower, 121 A.2d at 186). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing Mower, 121 A.2d at 187). 
 114. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 115. Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 870 (quoting Stancill v. Stancill, 408 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Md. 
1979)). 
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authority.  Specifically, section 452.315 of Vernon’s Annotated Missouri 
Statutes provides, in relevant part: 
  In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, either 
party may move for temporary maintenance and for temporary support 
for each child entitled to support. . . . As a part of a motion for tempo-
rary maintenance or support or by independent motion accompanied by 
affidavit, either party may request the court to issue an order after notice 
and hearing: . . . excluding a party from the family home or from the 
home of the other party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm 
would otherwise result; [or] establishing and ordering compliance with a 
custody order and providing for the support of each child.116 
The purpose of such temporary relief is to maintain the status quo dur-
ing the pendency of litigation.117 
Thus, in Missouri, claims for child custody, child support, alimony 
pendente lite, and counsel fees can be commenced and awards made 
while the parties are living under the same roof.118  A more frequently 
litigated question than whether the trial courts have the authority to or-
der pre-separation relief is whether a separation has actually occurred.  
Unlike North Carolina, and similar to California, the parties can be con-
sidered separated even while they are still living in the same residence.  
Missouri case law has defined the term ‘living together as husband and 
wife’ as meaning “the dwelling together in the same house, eating at the 
same table, the two parties, the man and woman in question, holding 
themselves out to the world and conducting themselves toward each 
other as husband and wife.”119  For example, in O’Brien v. O’Brien,120 the 
Missouri Court of Appeals held that where plaintiff wife and defendant 
husband lived in the same residence during the hearing on the wife’s 
motion for alimony and child support pendente lite, the trial court was 
not precluded from granting her motion121 where the parties had been 
living separate and apart as far as their marital relationship, and she 
 
 116. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.315 (West 2012). 
 117. See Coleberd v. Coleberd, 933 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Tisone v. 
Tisone, 881 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); In re Marriage of Kovach, 873 S.W.2d 
604, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Berbiglia v. Berbiglia, 442 S.W.2d 949, 951–52 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1969). 
 118. See Lipp v. Lipp, 117 S.W.2d 364, 365–66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that 
suit money was not precluded where husband and wife were sheltered by the same roof 
because the court concluded they were living separate and apart rather than as husband 
and wife). 
 119. Id. at 365 (citing Levy v. Goldsoll, 131 S.W. 420, 421–22 (1910)). 
 120. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 485 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). 
 121. Id. at 678. 
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moved to an apartment shortly after the hearing.122  In contrast, and as 
further illustration, in the Missouri case of Harper v. Harper,123 the wife 
brought suit for divorce and when the officer went to serve process on 
the defendant, the plaintiff and defendant were occupying the same bed; 
on those facts, the Supreme Court held that the parties had not separated 
and were living together as man and wife, and denied the relief re-
quested.124 
E.  Kansas 
Given its proximity to Missouri, one might expect a similar ap-
proach in the state of Kansas, but to no avail.  Kansas takes a drastically 
different approach to pre-separation orders on temporary support and 
child custody from other states.  Under section 60-1607(a) of the Kansas 
Annotated Statutes, a court has the authority to enter temporary orders 
concerning, among other things, “the disposition of the property of the 
parties,”125 “the use, occupancy, management and control of [the parties’] 
property,”126 and “the legal custody and residency of and parenting time 
with the minor children and the support, if necessary, of either party and 
of the minor children during the pendency of the action.”127  There is no 
requirement for the parties to be separated prior to commencing an ac-
tion seeking temporary relief under section 60-1607.  In addition, sec-
tion 60-1607(b) expressly allows the court to hear and decide these mat-
ters on an ex parte basis, but restricts a party’s ability to obtain an ex 
parte order that has “the effect of changing the residency of a minor child 
from the parent who has had the sole de facto residency of the child to 
the other parent”128 to situations in which “there is sworn testimony to 
support a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”129  Accordingly, 
Kansas courts have the authority to enter orders regarding possession 
 
 122. Id. at 676. 
 123. Harper v. Harper, 29 Mo. 301 (1860). 
 124. Id. at 302–04.  Note, however, that in Missouri there is no vehicle for the divi-
sion of property prior to the final disposition, and the trial court has a duty to fully dis-
pose of the property of the parties in its decree.  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.330.5 (West 
2012) (“The court’s order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final or-
der not subject to modification . . . .”); see also In re Long, 148 B.R. 904, 908 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1992); Morgan v. Morgan, 249 S.W.3d 226, 230–31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); 
Gurtz v. Gurtz, 186 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 125. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1607(a)(1) (2011). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. § 60-1607(a)(3). 
 128. Id. § 60-1607(b). 
 129. Id. 
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and ownership of the marital residence, even on an ex parte basis, before 
the parties have separated. 
If an ex parte order is entered, the court is required to hold a hear-
ing “within 15 days of the date on which a party requests a hearing 
whether to vacate or modify the order.”130  The onus is on the defendant 
spouse to file a motion and establish why the court’s decision, which was 
made without that spouse’s input or involvement, is incorrect.  The prac-
tical, if not legal, effect of section 60-1607(b) is to create a presumption 
in favor of the plaintiff spouse.  In fact, it is entirely possible that one 
spouse could wake up in the morning at the marital residence, go to 
work, and then come home in the evening expecting to have dinner with 
his or her family, only to find that a court has awarded possession of the 
home to the other spouse, along with custody of the parties’ children.  
As a result, the ousted spouse, who may not have even been aware that 
his or her partner was contemplating litigation, is immediately at a dis-
advantage.131 
Kansas’s approach can result in the type of outcome that the Harper 
court sought to prevent—a potentially innocent spouse who wants to 
remain in the parties’ marriage being banned from the marital residence.  
While Baumann gives North Carolina judges the ability to exercise dis-
cretion to determine when it is appropriate to consider and rule on 
claims for custody and child support prior to separation, and award pos-
session of the marital residence incident to those claims, Baumann spe-
cifically excepts the same relief incident to claims for post-separation 
support prior to the parties’ separation.  Kansas does not protect the 
rights of the defendant spouse in the same way and, some may argue, 
reaches too far into the lives of an otherwise intact family. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF BAUMANN 
While in most instances it would be unnecessary to address child 
custody and child support before the parties have separated, there may 
be circumstances in which it would be appropriate or even essential for 
the trial court to resolve these issues prior to separation in order to en-
sure that the best interests of the children are met.132  The holding in 
Baumann does not place any clear limitations on trial judges’ authority to 
enter pre-separation child custody and child support orders in North 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. E-mail from Preston A. Drobeck, Assoc., Berkowitz, Cook & Gondring, (Oct. 14, 
2011) (on file with authors). 
 132. See Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
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Carolina.  This means that trial courts will have to use their discretion in 
making determinations about the propriety of entering such orders on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Because of its far-reaching implications, Baumann has already raised 
concerns for many North Carolina family law practitioners about the 
possibility of governmental intrusion into an “intact” family.  As a result 
of the decision, there is vast uncertainty as to when it might now be 
plausible for a court to address these issues prior to separation.  Exam-
ples may include a same-sex couple living together where a complaint is 
filed solely for the purpose of indicating that the non-biological parent 
has custodial rights with respect to medical or academic matters; a mar-
ried couple that has no intention of separating, where one parent disa-
grees with the other as to whether a child should be baptized or raised in 
the Jewish faith, where one parent consents to a critical medical proce-
dure but the other refuses to allow the treatment, or where one parent 
consents to private school enrollment and the other insists that the child 
attend public school.  The current statutory and case law in North Caro-
lina does not provide any clear parameters to the trial court’s authority 
to rule in these cases and, as a result, some practitioners fear we are fac-
ing a slippery slope. 
Practical Application 
In addition to the substantive—and potentially problematic—
implications described above, the Baumann ruling also has procedural 
implications that will affect the way North Carolina lawyers practice law. 
The ruling in Baumann makes it clear that either party can now file 
claims for child custody and child support prior to separation.  While 
the trial court can award possession of the house to the party receiving 
payment of child support,133 the obligor cannot obtain possession of the 
house pursuant to section 50-13.4(e).134  While the Court of Appeals re-
lies on Lee’s North Carolina Family Law for the premise that “a court may 
order possession of real property as payment of child support or as a way 
to effectuate an order for custody,” it is unclear based on the strict statu-
tory language whether a custody claim alone would be sufficient to ob-
tain an award of possession of the marital residence.135 
 
 133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(e) (2011). 
 134. Jill Jackson, Address at Intensive Seminar, N.C. Bar Ass’n: Essential Elements of 
Money Claims: What You Need to Allege and Prove to Prevail (Fall 2011). 
 135. REYNOLDS, supra note 57, § 6.23(A). 
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The Baumann ruling did not change the state of the law that either 
party can file a claim for divorce from bed and board prior to separation.  
The trial court can award possession of a house to a party who prevails 
on a claim for divorce from bed and board.136  In addition, the trial court 
can award possession of a house to the party receiving payment of 
spousal support;137 however, the obligor cannot obtain possession of the 
house pursuant to section 50-16.7(a) of the North Carolina General Sta-
tutes.  In light of Baumann, it is unclear whether a dependent spouse can 
file post-separation support and/or alimony claims prior to separation if 
he or she also asserts a claim for divorce from bed and board.  Harper 
discussed, but did not decide, whether a claim for alimony can be filed 
prior to separation because, in that case, the wife did not assert a claim 
for alimony.  Baumann did not discuss divorce from bed and board be-
cause, in that case, the wife did not assert a claim for divorce from bed 
and board.  However, Baumann clearly holds that post-separation sup-
port claims cannot be filed prior to separation and is silent as to whether 
any exception would apply if such a claim is filed simultaneously with a 
claim for divorce from bed and board.  As a result, more conservative 
practitioners may elect to file a complaint for divorce from bed and 
board and, once adjudicated, assert claims for post-separation support 
and alimony by motion in the cause. 
CONCLUSION 
At this time, the statutory and case law in North Carolina does not 
provide any clear parameters or limits to the trial court’s authority to 
hear and decide the issues of child custody and child support prior to 
the parties’ separation, and it would be impossible to prescribe a frame-
work that would encompass every situation that may arise with regard to 
child custody or support.  North Carolina practitioners will have to wait 
on future interpretive appellate cases or legislative amendments for 
guidance on when it would be inappropriate for the trial court to invoke 
its authority to decide these issues.  Until then, North Carolina district 
court judges will face the difficult task of balancing the competing con-
cerns of governmental intrusion into an intact family with the duty to 
provide for the safety and welfare, support and maintenance of children 
within the jurisdiction.  While we venture into the unknown, North 
Carolina will have to trust its trial judges to determine when it is neces-
 
 136. See Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (requiring fault alle-
gations that would support award of “alimony” or “divorce”). 
 137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(a). 
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sary to invoke the power of the state to protect the interests of children, 
even when those interests conflict with the rights of parents. 
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